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Abstract
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
which poses a threat to their application in security sensi-
tive systems. We propose a Denoiser and UPsampler Net-
work (DUP-Net) structure as defenses for 3D adversarial
point cloud classification, where the two modules recon-
struct surface smoothness by dropping or adding points.
In this paper, statistical outlier removal (SOR) and a data-
driven upsampling network are considered as denoiser and
upsampler respectively. Compared with baseline defenses,
DUP-Net has three advantages. First, with DUP-Net as a
defense, the target model is more robust to white-box ad-
versarial attacks. Second, the statistical outlier removal
provides added robustness since it is a non-differentiable
denoising operation. Third, the upsampler network can be
trained on a small dataset and defends well against adver-
sarial attacks generated from other point cloud datasets. We
conduct various experiments to validate that DUP-Net is
very effective as defense in practice. Our best defense elim-
inates 83.8% of C&W and l2 loss based attack (point shift-
ing), 50.0% of C&W and Hausdorff distance loss based at-
tack (point adding) and 9.0% of saliency map based attack
(point dropping) under 200 dropped points on PointNet.
1. Introduction
Deep Learning has shown superior performance on sev-
eral categories of machine learning problems, especially
classification task. These Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
learn models from large training data to efficiently classify
unseen samples with high accuracy. However, recent works
have demonstrated that DNNs are vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples, which are maliciously created by adding im-
perceptible perturbations to the original input by attackers.
Adversarially perturbed examples have been deployed to at-
tack image classification service [18], speech recognition
system [5] and autonomous driving system [34].
∗Corresponding author.
Heretofore, numerous algorithms have been proposed to
generate adversarial examples for 2D images. When model
parameters are known, a paradigm called white-box attacks
includes methods based on calculating the gradient of the
network, such as FGSM [9], IGSM [10] and JSMA [23],
and based on solving optimization problems, such as L-
BFGS [29], Deepfool [21] and Carlini & Wagner (C&W)
attack [3]. In the scenario where access to the model is not
available, called black-box attacks.
Since the robustness of DNNs to adversarial examples
is a critical feature, defenses that target to increase robust-
ness against adversarial example are urgently considered
and can be classified into three main categories: input trans-
formations [7, 19, 20], adversarial training [29] and gradi-
ent masking [22, 41]. In addition to defense, detection of
adversarial examples before they are fed into the networks
is another approach to resist attacks, such as MagNet [20]
and steganalysis based detection [17].
The popularity of 3D sensors such as LiDAR and RGBD
cameras draws many research concerns with 3D vision. An
increasing number of accessible data motivates data-driven
deep learning methods practical to be used in many areas,
including autopilot [24, 43], robotics [12, 6] and graph-
ics [35, 13, 31]. In particular, point cloud is one of the
most natural data structures to represent the 3D geome-
try. After the difficult problem of irregular data format was
addressed by DeepSets [40], PointNet [4] and its vari-
ants [26, 32], point cloud data can be directly processed
by DNNs, and has become a promising data structure for
3D computer vision tasks. Hua et al. [11] propose a point-
wise convolution operator that can output features at each
point, which can offer competitive accuracy while being
easy to implement. Yang et al. [36] construct losses based
on mesh shape and texture to generate adversarial examples,
which aim to project the optimized “adversarial meshes”
to 2D with a photorealistic renderer, and still able to mis-
lead different DNNs. Xiang et al. [34] attack point clouds
built upon C&W loss and point cloud-specific perturbation
metric with high success rate. Zheng et al. [42] propose
a malicious point-dropping method to generate adversarial
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point clouds based on learning a saliency map for a whole
point cloud, which assigns each point a score reflecting its
contribution to the model-recognition loss. Liu et al. [16]
propose several iterative gradient based attack methods and
input restoration based defenses. Yang et al. [37] propose
point-detach strategy utilizing the critical point property to
attack neural network based classification system, and in-
troduce several perturbation defenses.
Adversarial examples do well in 3D point cloud classi-
fication, and probably cause inconvenient issues even se-
curity problems. Consequently, research on defense of 3D
point cloud adversarial example is in urgent need. Based
on the above reasoning, in this paper, we propose a defense
method against adversarial point cloud by training a De-
noiser and UPsampler Network (DUP-Net) to mitigate ad-
versarial effects. As far as we know, this is the first work
that demonstrates the effectiveness of point-dropping and
point-adding operations at inference time on mitigating ad-
versarial effects on the 3D dataset, e.g., ModelNet40. We
summarize the key contributions of our work as follows:
• We present two new defense modules to mitigate ad-
versarial point clouds, which have better performance
compared with baseline methods.
• The nondifferentiability property of denoise layer, sta-
tistical outlier removal, is utilized to defend the adver-
sarial white-box attacks.
• The upsampler network can be trained on a small
dataset and defends well against adversarial attacks
generated from other point cloud datasets.
We conduct comprehensive experiments to test the ef-
fectiveness of our defense method against point shift-
ing/dropping/adding attacks from [34, 39]. The results in
Section 4 demonstrate that the proposed DUP-Net can sig-
nificantly mitigate adversarial effects.
2. Related Work
2.1. Point Clouds and PointNet
A point cloud is a set of points which are sampled from
object surfaces. Consider a 3D point cloud with n points,
denoted by X = {xi|i = 1, 2, ..., n}, where each point xi
is a vector of its xyz coordinates. PointNet [25] and its
variants [26] proposed by Qi et al. exploit a single sym-
metric function, max pooling, to reduce the unordered and
dimensionality-flexible input data to a fixed-length global
feature vector and enable end-to-end neural network learn-
ing. They demonstrate the robustness of PointNet and intro-
duce the concept of critical points and upper bounds. The
points sets laying between critical points and upper bounds
yield the same global features, and thus PointNet is robust
to missing points and random perturbation.
2.2. Existing methods for adversarial attacks
Point Shifting. Xiang et al. [34] propose C&W frame-
work [3] based unnoticeable adversarial point clouds by
point perturbation. C&W is an optimization-based attack
that combines a differentiable surrogate for the classifica-
tion accuracy of the model. It generates adversarial exam-
ples by solving the following optimization problem:
min
δ
D(X,X + δ) + c · f(X + δ)
s.t. X + δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(1)
This attack seeks for the solution of both acquiring the
smallest perturbation D and impelling the network to clas-
sify the adversarial example incorrectly. For an untargeted
attack, f(X) is the loss function to measure the distance be-
tween the input and the adversarial object, as defined by:
f(X) = max(Z(X)true − max
i 6=true
{Z(X)i},−κ) (2)
where κ denotes a margin for regulating model transferabil-
ity and perturbation degree, and Z(X) is the logit vector.
Xiang et al. shift existing points negligibly and adopt dif-
ferent perturbation metrics D(X,X′) (lp norm, Hausdorff
distance and Chamfer measurement), where X′ stands for
adversarial point cloud. Liu et al. [16] extend fast/iterative
gradient method by constraining the perturbation magnitude
onto the surface of an epsilon ball in different dimensions.
Point Adding. Xiang et al. [34] also propose points
adding based attacks with C&W and Hausdorff/Chamfer
measurements. Because directly adding points to the un-
constrained 3D space is infeasible due to the large search
space, they propose an initialize-and-shift method to find
appropriate position for each added point. Besides, for ad-
versarial clusters, they minimize the radius of the generated
cluster to make it attached to the surface of original object.
Yang et al. [37] develop a variant of one-pixel attack [28]
using pointwise gradient method to only update the attached
points without changing the original point cloud.
Point Dropping. For any point cloud X, Qi et al. [25]
prove that there exists a subset C ⊆ X, namely criti-
cal subset, which determines all the max pooled features
max
xi∈X
{h(xi)}, and thus the output of PointNet, which is only
applicable to network structures similar to γ ◦max
xi∈X
{h(xi)}.
Visually, C usually distributes evenly along the skeleton of
X. In this sense, dropping points in C can also generate ad-
versarial point clouds. Zheng et al. [42] propose point drop-
ping based attack by first constructing the saliency map:
si = −rαi ri
∂L
∂ri
, (3)
where rαi
∂L
∂ri
= (xi−xc) ·gi (inner product), xc is the cloud
center and gi is the gradient under orthogonal coordinates
Figure 1: The pipeline of our DUP-Net defense method. The input point cloud is first denoised by a statistical outlier
removal layer and then upsampled by a pretrained upsampling neural network. The preprocessed point cloud is then fed into
the classification neural network.
gi = ∇xiL(X, y;θ), and α is a rescaling hyperparameter.
Points with n/T lowest si are dropped, and the operation
are iterative executed for T loops. Yang et al. [37] develop
a point-detach strategy similar to [42], which utilizes the
critical point property to iteratively detach the most impor-
tant point to confuse the attacked network.
2.3. Existing Methods for defenses
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training [9, 15, 30]
is one of the most investigated defenses against adversar-
ial attacks, which augment the training set with adversarial
examples to increase the model’s robustness against a spe-
cific attack. Adversarial training improves the classification
accuracy of the target model on adversarial examples.
Simple Random Sampling. In statistics, a simple ran-
dom sampling, or shortly SRS, is a subset of individuals
chosen from a larger set, where each sample is chosen ran-
domly with the same probability. For X containing n points,
we randomly sample r (r < n) points from X by
Pi(X) = {1x|x ∈ X,1x ∼ Ber(0.5)}, (4)
where x is sampled from Bernoulli(0.5) distribution to in-
dicate the existence of point x in the post-sampled set.
As described in [37], Gaussian noising and quantifica-
tion are another two basic defenses for point clouds, which
are similar to defenses for image adversarial examples.
3. Defenses against Adversarial Point Cloud
The goal of defense on 3D point clouds is to build a
network that is robust to adversarial examples, i.e., it can
classify adversarial point clouds correctly with little perfor-
mance loss on clean point clouds. Formally, given a clas-
sification model f and an input X˜, which may either be an
original input X, or an adversarial input X′, the goal of a
defense method is to either augment data to train a robust
f ′ such that f ′(X˜) = f(X), or transform X˜ by a transfor-
mation T such that f(T (X˜)) = f(X).
Towards this goal, we propose a method formed by a
denoiser and an upsampler, as shown in Figure 1, which
adds an outlier-removal layer and an upsampling network
to the front of the classification networks, to realize net-
work robustness. These layers are designed in the context of
point cloud classification on ModelNet40 [33] dataset and
are used in conjunction with a trained classifier f . The de-
fense function is denoted as D : X′ → Xˆ, where Xˆ denotes
the denoised and upsampled point cloud. Inspired from up-
sampling network for generating a denser and uniform set
of points [39], we define the loss function as
L(X, Xˆ) = Lrec(X, Xˆ) + βLrep(X, Xˆ) + γ‖θ‖22, (5)
where Lrec is the reconstruction loss and Lrep the repulsion
loss. θ indicates the network parameters, β balances the
reconstruction loss and repulsion loss, and γ denotes the
multiplier of weight decay.
3.1. Statistical Outlier Removal (SOR)
Since there exists outliers in raw point cloud data pro-
duced by 3D scanners, Rusu et al. [27] propose statis-
tical outlier removal method (SOR for short) which cor-
rects these irregularities by computing the mean µ and stan-
dard deviation σ of nearest neighbor distances, and trim the
points which fall outside the µ±α · σ, where α depends on
the size of the analyzed neighborhood.
We use k-nearest neighbors (kNN) for outlier removal.
Specifically, the kNN point set of each point xi of point
cloud X is defined as knn(xi, k). Then the average distance
di that each point xi has to its kNN is denoted by
di =
1
k
∑
xj∈knn(xi,k)
‖xi − xj‖2, i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
The mean and standard deviation of all these distances
are computed to determine a distance threshold:
d¯ =
1
n
n∑
i
di, i = 1, . . . , n, (7)
σ =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i
(di − d¯i)2. (8)
We trim the points which fall outside the µ ± α · σ, and
the manicured point set X′ is acquired by
X′ = {xi|di < d¯+ α · σ}. (9)
We explore the relationships between outliers and adver-
sarial points to explain why SOR is effective for defending
C&W based attacks. Despite that the attackers successfully
fool the classification network, there is always a certain per-
centage of points that inevitably become abnormal points
and are then captured and dropped by SOR. C&W attack
makes some points off the manifold of point cloud surface,
and such outliers mostly mislead the classification perfor-
mance. Therefore, the more outliers removed by prepro-
cessing layer, the better the defense ability against adversar-
ial examples. Here, we denote the percentage of adversarial
points in the removed point set by
p =
|Xadv ∩ (X− X′)|
|X| − |X′| , (10)
where Xadv is the set of adversarial points which is defined
differently w.r.t. diverse adversarial distortion constraints.
For a l2 loss, Xadv is defined by
Xadv = {x′i|‖xi − x′i‖2 > T (X,X′, )}, (11)
where x′i ∈ X′ and T (X,X′, ) is the threshold of l2 norm of
each paired points controlled by  the ratio of points that are
considered as adversarial points. For Hausdorff or Chamfer
based loss, Xadv is defined by
Xadv = {x′i|minm∈X ‖m− x
′
i‖2 > T (X,X′, )}, (12)
where x′i ∈ X′ and T (X,X′, ) is the threshold of Haus-
dorff/Chamfer distance between each point from X′ and
point set X controlled by .
By Equation (10), we acquire the percentage of adversar-
ial points p of SOR and SRS methods, and denote them by
pSOR and pSRS respectively. It is expected that pSOR > pSRS
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Figure 2: Comparison of pSOR and pSRS under l2 and Haus-
dorff loss based targeted adversarial examples on PointNet
network, respectively. The ratio  is set with 0.04.
Figure 3: The network architecture of point cloud upsam-
pling network (PU-Net).
since SOR scheme recognizes outliers as adversarial points
in a statistical pattern rather than random guess as SRS does.
We choose 300 point clouds as test examples to verify the
above inference, as shown in Figure 2. Most of pSOR of
point clouds are larger than pSRS, implying that SOR drops
more adversarial points than SRS. Thus SOR has a better
ability of defense against adversarial point clouds than SRS.
3.2. Upsampling Network
Our goal is to defend a classification model f against
the perturbed point clouds generated by an adversary. Our
approach is motivated by the manifold assumption [44],
which postulates that natural images or point clouds lie on
low-dimensional manifolds. The perturbed point clouds are
known to lie off the low-dimensional manifold of natural
point clouds, which is approximated by deep networks. We
Algorithm 1 Denoise and upsample points as defense
Input: Point cloud X, nearest neighbor number k, outlier
truncation parameter α and network parameter θ
Output: Prediction label l
1: Initialize X′ = ∅
2: Compute the average distance di that each point xi has
to its nearest k neighbors by Equation (6)
3: Compute the mean d¯ and standard deviation σ of all
these distances by Equation (7) and (8)
4: for i← 0 to n do
5: if the average distance di < d¯+ α · σ then
6: X′ = X′ ∪ xi (xi ∈ X)
7: The upsampled point clouds Xˆ is generated by feeding
X′ into upsampling network
8: Xˆ is fed into classification network f(Xˆ), and it outputs
the prediction label l
9: return Prediction label l
propose to use point cloud upsampling to remap off-the-
manifold adversarial samples on to the natural manifold to
reconstruct surface. In this manner, robustness against ad-
versarial perturbations is achieved by enhancing the visual
quality of point clouds. This approach offers significant ad-
vantages over other defense mechanisms that truncate criti-
cal information to achieve robustness.
Since these perturbations are generally missing critical
points from skeletons from point clouds, we use a point
cloud upsampling network that output a denser point cloud
that follows the underlying surface of the target object while
being uniform in distribution. The network considered in
this work is the Point Cloud Upsampling Network (PU-
Net) [39], which learns geometry semantics of point-based
patches from 3D models, and the architecture is illustrated
in Figure 3. To address the uncertain presence of the varying
part, the minimizer of Chamfer distance (CD) distributes
some points outside the main body at the correct locations;
while the minimizer of Earth Mover’s distance (EMD) is
considerably distorted [8]. We also try EMD [8] loss to ob-
serve the defense performance:
Lrec = D(X, Xˆ) = 1‖Xˆ‖0
∑
x′∈Xˆ
min
x∈X
‖x− x′‖22. (13)
The total loss function combines the reconstruction loss
Lrec and repulsion loss Lrep proposed in [8]. In contrast,
we use a simple upsampling method [2], which interpolates
points at vertices of a Voronoi diagram for comparative trial.
In summary, we have given a formal definition of the
proposed defense in Algorithm 1.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setup
Dataset. We utilize ModelNet40 [33] datasets to test
our proposed DUP-Net, which contains 12,311 CAD mod-
els from 40 object categories, where 9,843 objects are used
for training and the other 2,468 for testing. As done by
Qi et al., before generating adversarial point clouds us-
ing [39, 34] methods, first uniformly sample 1,024 points
from the surface of each object and rescale them into a unit
cube. We also use Visionair dataset collected by [39] for
training DUP-Net, which contains 60 different models from
the Visionair repository [1], ranging from smooth non-rigid
and steep rigid objects.
Networks and Implementation Details. We use Point-
Net [25] and PointNet++ [26] as targeted classification net-
works and train the models using default settings. To train
the proposed DUP-Net, for ModelNet40, the upsampled
point number is 2048 and the upsampling rate is 2; for Vi-
sionair dataset, the number is 4096 and upsampling rate is
4. Each input sample has n = 1024 points for both train-
ing procedures. The balancing weights β and γ are set as
0.01 and 10−5, respectively. The implementation is based
on TensorFlow. For the optimization, we train the network
for 120 epochs using the Adam [14] algorithm with a mini-
batch size of 28 and a learning rate of 0.001.
Attacks Evaluations. The attackers first generate adver-
sarial examples using the untargeted/targeted models and
then evaluate the classification accuracy of these generated
adversarial examples on the target and defense models. Low
accuracy of the untargeted/targeted model indicates that the
attack is successful, and high accuracy of the defense model
indicates that the defense is effective.
4.2. Ablation Study
Our proposed defense first deploys the SOR layer, which
aims to minimize the effect of outlier points perturbations,
followed by an upsampling network to selectively intro-
duce missing points into a point cloud and recover off-the-
manifold attacked point clouds.
SOR as Defense. We compare the detection accuracy
and attack success rate of targeted attacks of proposed SOR
defense with baseline SRS for C&W and shifting [34] based
attacks and dropping [42] based attacks on PointNet. Gaus-
sian noising and quantification are not considered as de-
fense because they will degrade accuracy of clean samples.
As shown in Figure 4a, for SRS baseline, as dropped
points increases, the attack success rate drops dramatically,
and the accuracy gradually increases with its maximum
65.1%; for clean examples, the accuracy is monotonically
decreasing. The tendency of three curves can be explained:
the attacks search the entire point cloud space for adver-
sarial perturbations without considering the location of the
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Figure 4: (a) SRS defense performance of clean and targeted adversarial point clouds on PointNet using C&W and shifting
loss; (b) SOR defense performance of clean and targeted adversarial point clouds on PointNet using C&W and shifting loss
under α = 1.1; (c) Defense performance of adversarial point clouds on PointNet with or without defense.
Models Target [4] Defense(SRS)
Defense (SOR)
(ours)
Defense (PU-Net)
(ours)
Defense (DUP-Net)
(ours)
Clean point cloud 88.3% 83.0% 86.5% 87.5% 86.3%
Adv (C&W + l2 loss) [34] 0.7% 64.7% 81.4% 23.9% 84.5%
Adv (C&W + Hausdorff loss) [34] 12.7% 58.8% 59.8% 17.6% 62.7%
Adv (C&W + Chamfer loss) [34] 11.8% 59.5% 59.1% 18.0% 61.4%
Adv (C&W + 3 clusters) [34] 0.7% 92.0% - - 87.6%
Adv (C&W + 3 objects) [34] 2.7% 92.4% - - 68.4%
Adv (dropping 50 points) [42] 75.5% 68.1% 71.3% 76.1% 73.9%
Adv (dropping 100 points) [42] 63.2% 56.4% 60.0% 67.7% 64.3%
Adv (dropping 150 points) [42] 50.4% 45.0% 48.6% 57.7% 54.4%
Adv (dropping 200 points) [42] 39.1% 35.1% 36.8% 48.1% 43.7%
Table 1: Classification accuracy under the white-box attack on PointNet. For the SRS defense model, number of random
dropped points is 500 and for SOR defense model, k = 2 and α = 1.1 are set as hyperparameters.
Models CW l2 CW Hausd Drop 200
Target [26] 0% 28.1% 56.4%
Defense (SRS) 66.7% 51.7% 47.3%
Defense (DUP-Net) 75.7% 54.1% 61.9%
Table 2: Comparison of classification accuracy using SRS and
proposed DUP-Net under PointNet++ network.
point cloud content, which is contrary to the classification
models that pay attention to object shapes [38]. Therefore,
dropping a few points with SRS erases the artifact bothered
by adversarial perturbation, which promotes defense of ad-
versarial point clouds. The structure of point cloud is still
preserved with a few points dropped; when more random
sampled points are dropped, the shape of the point cloud
deteriorates and thus the classification accuracy degrades.
As shown in Figure 4b, the SOR operation comprises
two influential factors, k the number of neighbor points
and α the percentage of points that are regarded as outliers.
When k = 0, the kNN point set only contains the point
itself, thus the statistical removal defense is noneffective;
when k ≥ 1, the defense works. When k = 2 and α = 1.1,
the accuracy of clean point clouds and adversarial examples
are 86.5% and 81.4% respectively. Compared to SRS de-
fense with its best accuracy of adversarial examples 65.1%,
SOR has a substantial increase of 16.3% on performance.
Similar results can be obtained on defenses of untargeted
attacks and Hausdorff loss based attacks.
For the vanilla attack scenario, the attackers are not
aware of the points-removal layer, and directly use the orig-
inal networks as the target model to generate adversarial ex-
amples. For reading convenience, we coin a new acronym
“adv” standing for “adversarial point clouds” in tables. As
shown in Table 1, the points-removal layer can mitigate the
adversarial effects on C&W methods significantly. As for
Networks Task
Shifting
(l2) [34]
Adding
(Hausdorff) [34]
Adding
(Chamfer) [34]
Dropping 100
points [42]
Dropping 200
points [42]
PointNet [25] Target 0.7% 12.7% 11.8% 63.2% 39.1%
PointNet++ [26]
Target 89.5% 52.9% 51.0% 82.4% 75.6%
Defense (SRS) 82.9% 59.6% 58.3% 70.3% 54.5%
Defense (DUP-Net) 84.3% 48.3% 48.5% 75.2% 67.3%
DGCNN [32]
Target 91.2% 51.4% 50.8% 75.5% 67.9%
Defense (SRS) 68.2% 38.2% 37.1% 72.2% 54.9%
Defense (DUP-Net) 40.7% 25.5% 26.7% 32.0% 26.7%
Table 3: Black-box attacks and defenses: accuracy of targeted C&W and shifting and adding based adversarial point clouds
and saliency map and points dropping based adversarial point clouds generated from PointNet on other classification net-
works [26, 32, 11] with or without defense.
l2 metric, SOR has the best performance with 81.4% accu-
racy. For Hausdorff and Chamfer loss metrics, SOR and
SRS have similar results with lower accuracy.
To validate whether differentiable point removal layer is
able to simulate non-differentiable layer, We train the mod-
ified PointNet with dropping probability p = 0.5 before
the max pooling layer, and conduct white-box attacks. The
classification accuracy of C&W l2, C&W Hausdorff and
drop 200 attacks are 0%, 0% and 54.5%, respectively, which
implies that the differentiable random point removal cannot
simulate non-differentiate layer well.
PU-Net as Defense. Here we investigate the indi-
vidual impact of PU-Net module towards defending ad-
versarial attacks. Since C&W based attack can be de-
fended by the proposed SOR layer, in this section we
only consider saliency point dropping based attack pro-
posed by Zheng et al. [42]. We perform extensive exper-
iments on three upsampler networks: pretrained PU-Net
model from [39] (Visonair-EMD), PU-Net with Chamfer
distance loss trained by Visonair (Visonair-CD) and PU-
Net with Earth Mover’s distance trained by ModelNet40
(ModelNet40-EMD), as shown in Figure 4c. The results
demonstrate that, upsampler network helps adversarial ex-
amples filling missing points that are critical for classifi-
cation, especially, when dropped number is 200, the de-
fense has nearly 9% increase. Besides, the upsampler net-
work can be trained on a small dataset and defends well
against adversarial attacks generated from other point cloud
datasets with fine generalization ability. We find that the
performance of the model trained by CD loss is similar with
that trained by EMD loss w.r.t. adversarial example defense,
which means that the selection of loss function does not
affect classification accuracy. SOR and SRS both deterio-
rate the defense performance, because the dropping attacks
visually damage the local shapes of point clouds, and the
SOR/SRS operation further amplifies the distortion.
We also compare PU-Net with a simple upsampling
method [2], which interpolates points at vertices of a
Voronoi diagram. Experiments show that PU-Net performs
much better than [2] by 8% when attacked by “Drop 200”.
4.3. Evaluation Results of DUP-Net
The last column in Table 1 shows the overall de-
fense accuracy of proposed DUP-Net against different
attacks (C&W based points-shifting/points-adding/cluster-
adding/object-adding [34] and point-dropping [42]) on
PointNet. For clean point clouds, DUP-Net slightly re-
duce 2% detection accuracy; for C&W attacks, DUP-Net
performs better than baseline SRS, proposed SOR and pro-
posed PU-Net. The DUP-Net performs better than PU-Net,
implying that the outlier removing operation is effective
in promoting defense performance. For point-dropping at-
tacks, DUP-Net defense is slightly worse than PU-Net alone
but still better than baseline, which implies that large modi-
fications made by attackers cause some local shapes to dis-
appear to a large degree, and SOR defense further breaks
critical skeleton information. For C&W cluster and C&W
object attacks, our DUP-Net defense improves the accura-
cies to 87.6% and 68.4%; with SRS defense, the accuracies
are 92.0% and 92.4%. These results further demonstrate
our strong defense ability. Because DUP-Net removes out-
liers of the manifold surface and SRS equiprobably removes
points, for these two tasks, SRS performs better.
Overall, DUP-Net as a preprocessing network help en-
sure the robustness of neural network based classification
and resist attacks from adversarial point clouds. Besides,
DUP-Net is non-differentiable which makes attacker diffi-
cult to implement secondary adversarial attacks.
4.4. Generability of DUP-Net
The transferability of targeted C&W based points-
shifting and points-adding attacks and saliency map based
points-dropping attack of PointNet on black-box classifica-
tion systems is shown in Table 3. Similar to [34], we test
the success rate of adversarial examples on PointNet++ and
Figure 5: Visualization of point clouds. The fifth column is the 200 points dropping attack. Red circles denote outliers and
missing object parts. Enlarge to see details.
DGCNN. The result illustrates that C&W based adversar-
ial samples have limited transferability; while for points-
dropping attacks, they are more transferable to other net-
works. We find that for black-box defense, adding a de-
fense network (SRS layer or DUP-Net) before the classifi-
cation network deteriorates the classification accuracy, thus
our proposed defense scheme is only suitable for white-box
attack, and in such cases, the defense sides do not need the
preprocessing network. The results show that deploying
DUP-Net does not improve defense ability against black-
box attacks owning to the network structure dissimilarity.
In Table 2, we implement the experiments on Point-
Net++, which further shows our proposed DUP-Net can be
utilized for different target recognition models.
4.5. Visualization
Figure 5 shows the details of clean point clouds, adver-
sarial point clouds and the denoised and upsampled point
clouds. From top to bottom the classes of point clouds are
“vase”, “car” and “flower pot”, respectively. It shows that
C&W attacks produce outliers that lie far away from the
manifold of points, while saliency map based attacks drop a
cluster of points. We denote the outliers and dropped clus-
ter by red circles. The SOR denoiser drops some outliers
to neutralize the attack success rates of adversarial point
clouds, and then PU-Net strengths the smoothness of local
region to assist the classification of models.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a denoiser and upsampler net-
work (DUP-Net) formed by a statistical outlier removal
(SOR) layer and a point cloud upsampling network (PU-
Net) to defend against 3D point cloud adversarial exam-
ples. We propose to use point cloud restoration techniques
to purify perturbed point clouds. As an initial step, we ap-
ply SOR to suppress any outlier based noise patterns and
formulate a non-differentiable layer that is difficult to by-
pass. The central component of our approach is the upsam-
pling operation, which enhances the point resolution while
simultaneously removing adversarial patterns similar to im-
age super-resolution operation. Our experiments show that
point cloud upsampling network alone is sufficient to rein-
state classifier beliefs towards correct categories; besides,
the statistical outlier removal step provides added robust-
ness since it is a non-differentiable denoising operation.
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